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The Politics of Ethics
by Laurie L. Levenson*
INTRODUCTION
1
Prosecutors hate being told what to do. As "ministers of justice," they
feel imbued with a moral compass that rarely, if ever, needs tweaking by
outsiders. Their mission to protect society and the Constitution provides
sufficient guidance. Being told how to be "ethical" is downright insulting
for attorneys who already perceive themselves as wearing the white hat.
Efforts to create ethical standards to guide a prosecutor's work may be
perceived as little more than an unnecessary intrusion upon the
prosecutor's independence and personal sense of justice. For some
prosecutors, it is unwarranted meddling into the prosecution's business.
As former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh once famously said,
"[T]he defense bar, with A.B.A. sponsorship, is attempting to use rules of

*Professor of Law & David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles. Stanford University (A.B., 1977); University of California Los Angeles
(J.D., 1980). Former Assistant United States Attorney for the Central District of California
(1981-1989). Founding Director, Loyola's Project for the Innocent. Professor Levenson is
very grateful to the Mercer Law Review for sponsoring the Symposium on "Disruptive
Innovation in Criminal Defense" and to her wonderful colleagues at the SEALS Conference
for their insightful remarks regarding this Article. Many thanks also to Amber Kennedy
Madole, Alexandra James, Samantha Garza, and Carla Espinoza for their assistance in
researching this Article and to her wonderful husband, Douglas Mirell, for his endless
patience and careful editing. A special thank you, as well, to Bruce Green and Charles Olson
for their input and their ongoing efforts to improve ethical standards for prosecutors.
Finally, thank you to Hannah Couch, Lead Articles Editor, Mercer Law Review (J.D., 2018),
for her extraordinary efforts in coordinating this Mercer Law Review Symposium.
1. See Eric S. Fish, ProsecutorialConstitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 244-46
(2017); Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
762, 767 (2016). As Professor Bruce Green discusses in his recent article, "Prosecutors have
long been thought to have a distinctive responsibility 'to see that justice is done."' Bruce A.
Green, ProsecutorialEthics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 461, 467 (2017). The
real issue is how to ensure that they meet this responsibility so the title of "minister of
justice" is not just empty words. See Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutoras
Minister of Justice and Administratorof Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301 (1996).
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professional
conduct to
stymie criminal
investigations and
prosecutions." 2
Prosecutors are particularly sensitive if it is their adversary who
wants to set the ethical standards. Given our adversarial system, this
reaction is not surprising. Any efforts to affect the other side's conduct
can easily be misperceived as an attempt to gain a tactical advantage.
Thus, we should not be surprised when prosecutors chafe at new ethical
rules. The very proposals suggest (1) prosecutors have not been ethical
enough and (2) their opponents know better how prosecutors should do
their jobs. Thus is the politics of ethics.
One of the most significant influences on prosecutors has been the
movement to set specific, enforceable ethical standards on prosecutors'
discovery obligations. Many prosecutors pride themselves on holding the
moral high-ground during trials. 3 From the moment they announce that
they are representing the public, as opposed to an individual, the
message is that the prosecutor's mission is to "seek justice."4 It is no
surprise that one of the most repeated statements by prosecutors in their
handbooks 5 and pleadings is the famous quote from Berger v. United

States:6

[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty .

.

. whose interest, therefore, in a

criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not

escape or innocence suffer.7

This quote is often joined by this oft-cited language regarding the role
of the prosecutor: "The prosecutor . .. enters a courtroom to speak for the
People and not just some of the People. The prosecutor speaks not solely

2. William Glaberson, ThornburghPolicy Leads to a Sharp Ethics Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1991, at B4.
3. See Abbe Smith, Can You be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 355 (2001).
4. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION,

STANDARD 3-1.2(B) (AM. BAR AsS'N 1993).
5. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, The Right Thing, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTORS (2016); HANDBOOK
FOR DISCOVERY, CITY BAR CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, NEW YORK CITY
BAR (Sept. 18, 2013); Criminal Discovery Under Brady v. Maryland: Current Developments

Issues (2013).
6. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
7. Id. at 88.
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for the victim, or the police, or those who support them, but for all the
People."

8

By contrast, defense lawyers are portrayed as representing only the
interests of an individual defendant who may or may not be deserving of
public support or sympathy.9 Accordingly, prosecutors instinctively react
negatively when a governing body, which may be reacting to complaints
by the defense bar, seeks to impose ethical standards on them. Unlike
rulings from a court, these new ethical standards challenge the core of
prosecutors' beliefs that they are already ethically superior to their
adversaries, and for some, represent an effort by their adversaries to put
them on the defensive. They are-in the prosecutors' eyes-a disruptive
influence.
The redrafting of California's ethical rules set the stage for such a
contest between prosecutors and defense lawyers in deciding how much
10
control outside bodies should have over prosecutorial practices.
Throughout the process, prosecutors were concerned that the State Bar
would unnecessarily undermine their work. Unless prosecutors could
dominate the decision-making, they were extremely reluctant to accept
the new ethical standards.
Prosecutors today, at least in California, dominate those institutions
that control the adoption of new ethical standards." Whether it be the
8. Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 660 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Carol A. Corrigan, On
ProsecutorialEthics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537, 538 (1986)).
9. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 59 (1988) (Most people assume "the
paradigmatic case of the morally dubious representation is the defense of the guilty
criminal [and] the defense . . . gets him back out on the street.").
10. In 2010, California began to redraft its Rules of Professional Conduct. However, in
2014, the California Supreme Court scrapped those efforts and ordered a new Commission
to begin redrafting the rules. See Second Comm'n for the Revision of the Rules of Prof'l
Conduct, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/
2 14
(last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
Ethics/Committees/Rules-Revision/Rules-Commission- 0
11. Since the early 1990s, there has been a continued shift in the power of the organized
bar in favor of prosecutors. Before the shift, "prosecutors expressed reflexive mistrust of
professional regulatory institutions." Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional
Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873, 904 (2012). In some states, prosecutors did not
participate in American Bar Association (ABA) activities, and the perception was that the
ABA was dominated by "Big Law" and the defense bar. For example, as reported by former
General Counsel and Professional Responsibility Officer for the Prosecuting Attorneys'
Council, Charles C. Olson, from the mid-1970s until 2000, prosecutors were not represented
in the leadership of the Georgia Bar or ABA committees. Email from Charles Olson to
Author (Dec. 12, 2017) (on file with Author) (noting that one reason for prosecutors not
being represented was their inability to pay ABA dues). However, today, prosecutors across
the nation enjoy considerable strength within their Bars, and the anti-regulation rhetoric
is used more as an advocacy tool than a serious attempt to enact ethical rules fair to both
sides.
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large bar institutions, or even the courts, prosecutors and former
prosecutors hold positions of power. A challenge to the bar rules is also,
in its own way, a challenge to the control over the profession and its key
agencies.12

This Article explores how the process of adopting new ethical rules
influences prosecutorial behavior. To what extent are new ethical rules a
disruptive influence for prosecutors? Why are prosecutors so scared of
new ethical standards? How is the governance of the legal profession,
especially for those participating in the criminal justice system, affected
by reforms in ethical codes?
Part I of this Article chronicles recent efforts in California to adopt an
ethical rule requiring prosecutors to disclose all potentially exculpatory
information to the defense. California is the last jurisdiction in the
United States to adopt such a rule.13 The effort was spearheaded by
Innocence Projects and defense lawyers. 14 The more-than-three-year
campaign was only recently resolved after countless hearings on the

12. Bruce Green has identified a checklist of reasons prosecutors have given for not
trusting outside groups, even the ABA, to propose rules governing prosecutorial conduct.
Prosecutors have asserted, among other arguments:
*Courts, bar associations, and disciplinary authorities should not be making
and enforcing rules for prosecutors because they don't know how prosecutors
should behave in any given situation. Prosecutors know best.
*The ABA in particular cannot be trusted because it has been captured by the
defense bar.
*Prosecutors' conduct is too complicated to be dictated by enforceable rules
.... Prosecutors should be left to decide what is best as a matter of independent
professional judgment informed by their experience.
eNew ethics rules will lead to frivolous and oppressive disciplinary
complaints by inmates and defense lawyers.
*The heightened risk of discipline created by additional rules will make
prosecutors overly cautious, impeding their effectiveness.
eDefendants will use the new rules as the basis for motions in criminal cases,
taking up time and resources and potentially creating new, unintended legal
rights.
Green, ProsecutorialEthics in Retrospect, supra note 1, at 481. All of these arguments are
a clear sign that prosecutors perceive defense lawyers' involvement in drafting ethical
standards for prosecutors as disruptive and a threat to prosecutorial independence.
13. California has the second-highest number of lawyers in the country. According to a
2015 ABA Report, California's 165,952 lawyers ranked second next to New York's Bar of
172,630 lawyers. See AM. BAR Ass'N, NAT'L LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/market-researchlNational
% 2 0Lawyer%2Population%20by%2State%202007-2017.authcheckdam.pdf.
14. Letter from The Innocence Project and Loyola Law School to the State Bar of
California (Dec.11, 2014); Letter from California's Public Defender's Association and
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice to the State Bar of California (Oct. 8, 2015) (on
file with State Bar of California).
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issue. 15 Throughout the process, many prosecutorial agencies
consistently took the position that such a rule was unnecessary because
6
prosecutors already had a constitutional duty under Brady v. Maryland
to provide exculpatory evidence that is material to a defendant's guilt or
sentencing. The committee redrafting the rules had strong prosecutorial
representation, including the former Chief Assistant of the United States
Attorney's Office for the Central District of California. The state bar
trustees voting on the issue were recently led by a former district
17
attorney; his vice-chair was also a district attorney. Convincing them of
the need for the rule, as well as the language that should be used, was a
challenging process.
Part II of this Article discusses how politics has played a role in the
drafting and enforcement of ethical standards for prosecutors. Fear of
adverse rulings by the courts is often insufficient to ensure that
prosecutors comply with court and professional conduct rules.
Prosecutors know that judges are reluctant to "let the guilty go free" just
18
because the prosecutor has blundered. However, disciplinary hearings
are of a different character. A prosecutor's reputation and professional
status are on the line, so there can be very real consequences to the
prosecutor individually. Accordingly, prosecutors and defense lawyers
are keenly aware that the requirements of professional rules of conduct
can affect prosecutors.
Finally, Part III offers some proposals addressing the ways defense
lawyers can use new ethical rules to combat ongoing problems with
prosecutorial misconduct. By focusing on enacting and enforcing ethical
rules for prosecutors, defense lawyers can be a positive disruptive force
that will lead to more accurate and fairer resolutions of cases.

15. On November 2, 2017, the California Supreme Court adopted Rule 5-110 (Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor). See Proposed Rules, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.
calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Ethics/Committees/Rules-Revision/Rules-Com
mission-2017/Proposed-Rules (last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
16. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
17. California's immediate past Bar President was James P. Fox, former District
Attorney for San Mateo County. His Board of Trustees also included other senior members
of large District Attorney's Offices. The Second Commission for drafting of the California
Rules included the Chief Assistant United States Attorney for the Central District of
California. See News Release, State Bar of California, State Bar Board Elects James P. Fox
to Lead Public ProtectionAgency (July 22, 2016), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/NewsEvents/News-Releases/ArtMID/10234/ArticlelD/153/State-Bar-Board-elects-James-P-Foxto-lead-public-protection-agency.
18. Of course, the classic adage is that "[tihe criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926).
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I. THE THREE-YEAR BATTLE TO ADOPT BASIC ETHICAL RULES
GOVERNING PROSECUTORS IN CALIFORNIA

For more than three years, defense lawyers and other groups
representing criminal defendants, such as Loyola Law School's Project
for the Innocent, sought to influence the work of prosecutors by
promoting the adoption of a new ethical rule requiring California
prosecutors to disclose potentially exculpatory information. 19 Despite the
adoption of some version of ABA Model Rule 3.820 governing prosecutorial
discovery obligations by all of the other forty-nine states, the United
States Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia, the California State
Bar was yet to fully embrace the concept that prosecutors have a special
responsibility to provide such discovery. 2 1 Perhaps because prosecutors
dominated the leadership of the state bar, 22 or because prosecutors had
such a strong lobby in the state, 23 California's Rules of Professional
Conduct went no further than stating that "[a] member [i.e., a lawyer]

19. See Laurie Levenson & Barry Scheck, California is Overdue in Adopting Rule on
Exculpatory Evidence, L.A. TIMEs (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/laoe-12 1 6 -levenson-prosecutorial-misconduct-20141216-story.html. The California Supreme
Court continued to deliberate on whether to adopt the new proposed rule. See Wendy Wen
Yun Chang, High Court Weighs New Prosecutor Rules, L.A. DAILY J. (Oct. 2016). This
Article is not intended to chronicle every step in the process that got the new rule adopted.
Rather, it focuses on the tensions between prosecutors and defense lawyers in adopting the
new rule. Creating a record of such disputes can add to our understanding of the impact of
the rules and the motivation for changes. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Politics of Legal
Ethics: Case Study of a Rule Change, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 425 (2011). See generally Ted
Schneyer, Professionalismas Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
20.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).

21. See Don J. DeBenedictis, State Mulls Rules for Prosecutors, 128 L.A. DAILY J. 1
(Apr. 3, 2015) ("Of all the states in the nation, California is the only one that does not impose
an ethical obligation on criminal prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence to the
defense."); see also David Keenan, Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer,
The Myth of ProsecutorialAccountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing
ProfessionalResponsibility Measures Cannot ProtectAgainst ProsecutorialMisconduct, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 222 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-myth-ofprosecutorial-accountability-after-connick-v-thompson-why-existing-professional-responsi
bility-measures-cannot-protect-against-prosecutorial-misconduct.
22. The immediate past president of the California State Bar was the district attorney
of San Mateo County. The vice-chair was a supervisor in the Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office. See State Bar of Cal., State Bar Board Elects James P. Fox to Lead Public
Protection Agency (July 22, 2016), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/News-Events/NewsReleases/ArtMID/10234/ArticlelD/153/State-Bar-Board-elects-James-P-Fox-to-lead-public
-protection-agency.
23. The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) boasts thousands of
members and is led by a well-funded staff that includes full-time lobbyists. See generally
CAL. DISTRICT ATT'Ys ASS'N, https://www.cdaa.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
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shall not suppress [any] evidence that the member or the member's client
has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce." 24 Prosecutors argued that
the adoption of any ethical rules that impose special disclosure
responsibilities upon prosecutors would undermine their ability to serve
the public. 25
Although some counties have interpreted current California case law
26
to require disclosure of all exculpatory evidence, many offices, including
the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and the U.S.
Department of Justice, had not. Rather, they took the position that
prosecutors are only required to disclose exculpatory evidence deemed to
be "material" to the defense under the postconviction discovery standard
of Brady v. Maryland.27 As a result, California has been plagued with
wrongful convictions that are the result 28of prosecutors' failure to
recognize and disclose exculpatory evidence.
In opposing the proposed ethical rule, prosecutors argued that it would
be disruptive for prosecutors to worry about disciplinary consequences
for their actions. 29 It is quite apparent they were less concerned about

judges taking action against them than they were about potential state
30
bar disciplinary proceedings using the proposed new ethical rules.

24. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5-220.
25. See CAL. DISTRICT ATT'Ys ASS'N, THE CALIFORNIA PROSECUTOR-INTEGRITY,
INDEPENDENCE, LEADERSHIP (2012) ("Over the last few years, there seems to have been a
concerted effort to discredit the prosecutorial profession."); Letter from California's Public
Defender's Association and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice to the State Bar of
California (Oct. 8, 2015) (on file with State Bar of California).
26. In fact, a proper reading of California state law supports the argument that
California law requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence or information
regardless of materiality, although California's cases do not yet address the standard for
disclosure of impeachment evidence. See People v. Cordova, 62 Cal. 4th 104, 124 (2015);
Barnett v. Superior Ct., 50 Cal. 4th 890, 901 (2010).
27. See Letter from California District Attorneys Association to Commission on the
Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Oct. 1, 2015) (on file with State Bar of
California).
28. In 2016, there were a record number of 166 exonerations in the United States.
NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016 1, 3 (Mar. 7, 2017). Nine of those

were in California, ranking California the fourth highest in exonerations, behind only
Texas, Illinois, and New York. Id. at 5. In 2017, there were nine exonerations in California.
NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
29. Letter from California District Attorneys Association to Commission on the
Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Oct. 1, 2015) (on file with State Bar of
California).
30. Indeed, there is good reason for prosecutors not to worry about courts using their
supervisory powers to discipline prosecutors. It is rarely done, and when it occurs, there are
limits to the court's powers. For example, in 1983, in United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S.
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Perhaps because of the close relationship between prosecutors and
judges, 3 1 or because they knew that judges were extremely reluctant to
reverse convictions even when there has been a discovery violation, or
because of the documented history of judges interpreting rules in favor of
prosecutors out of deference to the exigencies of their work, 32 prosecutors
have been willing to take their chances in front of the judiciary. 33 It was
the possibility of a public censure that really scared them, and they were
definitely spooked by the idea that defense lawyers might have a say in
how their ethics will be evaluated.34
II. WHY WERE PROSECUTORS SO WORRIED? 35
In some ways, it was surprising that prosecutors were alarmed by the
possibility that defense. lawyers could play some role in defining
prosecutorial ethical obligations. The original Kutak Commission that

&

499, 504 (1983), the appeals court reversed a case "to discipline the prosecutor-and warn
other prosecutors" about their perceived prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court of
the United States ordered the convictions reinstated, taking a more restricted view of the
court's supervisory powers. "With rare exception, courts remain deferential to prosecutors."
Green, ProsecutorialEthics in Retrospect, supranote 1, at 478. However, some judges have
taken the innovative approach of not waiting for Brady violations to address prosecutorial
misconduct. Rather, they have developed a model Brady colloquy to ensure prosecutorial
compliance. See Jason Kraeg, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47 (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/09/67_StanL
RevOnline_47_Kreag.pdf.
31. See Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem with Cynical Prosecutor's Syndrome:
Rethinking a Prosecutor'sRole in Post-ConvictionCases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335, 368
(2015).
32. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors,
88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000)).
33. See generally Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to
Discipline Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 881 (2015) (lamenting the failure of both the courts and disciplinary
committees to take prosecutors to task).
34. Until the proposed rules, prosecutors in California have had little to fear from
discipline by the California State Bar. See KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY,
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 19972009, 54 (Oct. 1, 2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=
1001&context=ncippubs.
35. For an excellent history of the regulation of the bar and the history of prosecutors'
mistrust of the rules processes, see Green, Prosecutors, supra note 11, at 875-82. For
general histories of the regulation of ethical standards, see Michael Ariens, The Agony of
Modern Legal Ethics, 1970-1985, 5 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 134 (2014); John S.
Dzienkowski, Ethical Decision Making and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 55 (2013); Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Revolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385 (2004); Jorge L. Carro, The Ethics Opinions of the Bar: A
Valuable Contributionor an Exercise in Futility?, 26 IND. L. REV. 1 (1992).
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drafted the ABA's Model Rules was comprised of twelve members,
including ten lawyers and two non-lawyers. 6 Although most of its
members came from academe and civil practice, one of the key authors of
ABA Model Rule 3.8 governing prosecutorial discovery duties was Robert
L. Weinberg of Williams & Connolly.37 Weinberg litigated criminal and
civil cases for thirty-five years.3 8 His involvement in drafting the new
ethical rules was not viewed as disruptive; rather, it was seen as an
endorsement by the most prominent leaders of the bar of standards that
would direct prosecutorial decision-making.
Since the original commission, defense lawyers and prosecutors
continue to have input into changes in the ABA's ethical rules. 39 For
many years, the ABA took a rather conservative position regarding
prosecutorial rules, "err[ing] on the side of conservatism rather than
comprehensiveness." 40 The politics of ethics has continued to play a key
role in the adoption of ethical rules affecting prosecutors. As Bruce Green
has said, "Rule 3.8 can best be understood as a product of happenstance,
politics, and stasis but not principle." 41 If we are to make progress in
using ethical rules, such as Rule 3.8, to define the responsibilities of
prosecutors, it is vital to understand and address the politics affecting
the adoption of ethical rules.

36. Schneyer, supranote 19, at 693-94.
37. Short Bio of Robert L. Weinberg for Eilat-2013, AM. BAR AsS'N, https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/international law/2013/05/law-business-andsoci
ety-usisraelglobalrelationships/weinberg-bio.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
38. Id.
39. While this Article focuses on the adoption of Rule 3.8 as an ethical rule, there is a
rich history of ethical rulemaking in the United States. Until the early 1900s, the American
bar functioned without formal codes of ethics. In the early 1900s, the ABA began
promulgating ethical rules. The first code was adopted in 1903. The Canons of Professional
Ethics were replaced by the Canons and Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970.
In 1977, the ABA began replacing the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Since then, both the ABA and individual states have regularly evaluated and
amended their ethical rules. See generally Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of their Own:
Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-AdversarialRoles of FederalProsecutors,37
B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996). The critical task force for the ABA Prosecution and Defense
Function Standards had ample representation by both prosecution and defense lawyers,
including the Chief Public Defender in Miami, Florida, and the Chief Deputy Prosecutor for
King County, Seattle, Washington. The Liaisons to the Task Force included a
representative from the National District Attorneys Association and National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE

PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). See generally Martin Marcus, The Making of the
ABA CriminalJustice Standards, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10 (2009).
40. Bruce Green, ProsecutorialEthics as Usual, 5 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587 (2003).
41. Id. at 1603.
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In 1996, Professor Roberta Flowers noted that the adversarial roles
were affecting the drafting of ethical codes. 42 In particular, the ethical
rules failed to recognize the expanded role of government attorneys in
the investigation and resolution of cases. 43 Professor Flowers encouraged
those redrafting the ethical rules to set aside their adversarial
preference. 44 In the context of ABA commissions, there has been some
success in integrating prosecutors and defense lawyers in drafting new
ethical standards. 45 However, on the state and local levels, the adversary
process still permeates code-making efforts. In jurisdictions like
California, prosecutors have been successful in protecting themselves
from rules that might subject them to the threat of professional
discipline. 46
Yet, despite the fact that prosecutors have had a prominent role in the
drafting of ethical rules,4 7 they nonetheless fear discipline. For the
guarded prosecutor, ethical rules are little more than a means for defense
lawyers to intimidate prosecutors and complain unfairly about their
decisions. Prosecutors fear that defense lawyers will threaten
disciplinary action to gain an advantage for their clients.48 In the past,
prosecutors have openly complained that the use of rules of professional
conduct is nothing more than an attempt "to stymie criminal
investigations and prosecutions." 49 New rules requiring that defense
lawyers have a voice on key ABA committees have added to those
concerns. Prosecutors have been and continue to be suspicious of the role
42. Flowers, supra note 39, at 923.
43. Id. at 925-26.
44. Id. at 927; Roberta K. Flowers, Professionalism and the Criminal Prosecutor,
Florida Institute for Litigation Ethics at Stetson University College of Law (1997).
45. At times, this same criticism is also lodged against the American Bar Association
that "the ABA has improperly promoted the interests of the criminal defense bar, seeking
to adopt rules which give undue weight to defense lawyers at the expense of the
prosecution's interests." The Comm. on Criminal Law, EstablishingEthical Standardsfor
FederalProsecutorsand Defense Lawyers, 49 REc. AsS'N BAR CITY N.Y. 21, 26 (1994).
46. Letter from California District Attorneys Association to Commission on the
Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Oct. 1, 2015) (on file with State Bar of
California).
47. See Andrew L. Sonner, Prosecutors' Voices Heard Through Debate and
Compromise, 7 CRIM. JUST. ii (1992) (discussing prosecutors' roles in ABA drafting of rules
and Criminal Justice Section efforts).
48. While threatening such action is unethical if designed to gain an advantage in a
civil dispute, there is no such prohibition when disciplinary action might help a side in a
criminal matter. See, e.g., CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 5-100(A).
49. See John M. Burkoff, ProsecutorialEthics: The Duty Not 'To Strike Foul Blows," 53
U. PITT. L. REV. 271, 275 (1992) (quoting Joint Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
the National Association of Attorneys General, and the National District Attorneys
Association 1 (Aug. 6, 1991)).
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of ethical rules and regulatory institutions in controlling the criminal
justice system.5 0
Of course, the great irony in this so-called fear of discipline is that
prosecutors are rarely disciplined. 51 As noted by former U.S. Attorney
Thomas P. Sullivan and renowned journalist Maurice Possley, a
comprehensive study of prosecutorial misconduct by federal prosecutors
demonstrated that in 201 cases where federal prosecutors acted
improperly, there was only one instance where a federal prosecutor was
disbarred. 52 Another study indicated that the overwhelming number of
jurisdictions have never filed a complaint against prosecutors for
violating their discovery obligations. 53 Indeed, it is extremely unlikely for
any prosecutor-state or federal-to face disciplinary action by a
professional governing body.54 Nevertheless, prosecutors continue to
view ethical rules as an attack on their independence.
With the ability to seek discipline of prosecutors, defense lawyers have
the means to disrupt prosecutorial operations; prosecutors are fully
aware of that capability. Even a mere referral to the Department of
Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility can have a dramatic impact
upon a federal prosecutor's career, regardless of whether it ultimately
ends in discipline.55 Vigorous enforcement of ethical rules in state

50. See Green, Prosecutors, supra note 11, at 904. ("[The] negative attitude toward
professional regulation by the organized bar-which has little basis in reality-has
persisted in shaping prosecutors' rhetoric.").
51. See generally Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, supra note 1, at 478;
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. 2015); Green, Prosecutors,
supra note 11, at 874; CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., California Commission
on the FairAdministrationof Justice FinalReport 70-72 (2008); Angela J. Davis, The Legal
Profession'sFailure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (2007);
JOSEPH F. LAWLESS JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW, PROCEDURE, FORMS 5-107

(2009); Richard Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 728 (1987). In fact, there may be good reasons that
prosecutors are not frequently disciplined. Many of the ethical rules do not apply to
prosecutors' practices. Moreover, because prosecutors have broad discretion and must make
repeated appearances before the same judges, they have added incentives not to transgress
and more leeway in what will be considered a transgression. Finally, "[b]oth inside and
outside the prosecutorial realm, disciplinary authorities are [simply] loath to pursue such
cases." See Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDiscipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV.
721, 736 (2001).
52. Sullivan & Possley, supra note 33, at 892.
53. Rosen, supra note 51, at 730-31, reported in Alafair S. Burke, Talking About
Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119 (2010).
54. Sullivan & Possley, supra note 33, at 892.
55. Very few referrals to the Office of Professional Responsibility result in discipline of
federal prosecutors. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFF. OF PROF. RESP., ANNUAL REPORTS 2005-
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and by the Office of Professional
disciplinary proceedings
Responsibility,5 6 while not a new idea, may be one of the most promising
"innovations" to disrupt the current culture of prosecutorial disregard for
defendants' rights.57 It is also one that must be approached very
carefully.
Throughout the years, bar associations have witnessed skirmishing
between prosecutors and defense lawyers regarding ethical rules.5 8 In
2006, United States District Judge David G. Trager wrote an article
recounting the dispute regarding the adoption and application of the
ethical rule protecting communications between a lawyer and a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by counsel.59 At that time, it appeared to
the judge that the bar associations' committees were more heavily
weighted with representation from the defense side in criminal practice.
Judge Trager analyzed the political battle over ABA DR 7-104(a)(1), 60
and in particular, how it would apply to the secret taping of witnesses by
prosecutors or defense lawyers. He noted that a major obstacle in
adopting and applying ethical standards was that committee members
''were too concerned with viewing the rules through the lens of their
practice."6 1 With their narrow self-interests in mind, rules would be
created and applied that, in retrospect, were neither useful nor

2015 (2015). Moreover, of all the complaints made in 2015, for example, only eight of them
(11.9%) involved discovery obligations. See id. at tbl. 2.
56. The Department of Justice maintains an independent Office of Professional
Responsibility, which is charged with investigating allegations of misconduct by federal
prosecutors. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.39(a) (2018). For more information regarding the Office of
Professional Responsibility and its impact on prosecutorial misconduct, see Bruce A. Green,
PolicingFederalProsecutors:Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 84-87 (1995).
57. For an article containing great ideas for addressing prosecutorial misconduct, see
Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
51 (2016).
58. In fact, some of the fiercest skirmishing occurred during the ABA's adoption of ABA
Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h), which require prosecutors to re-examine a conviction when they
receive substantial new evidence of innocence, to disclose that evidence to the defense, and
to seek a remedy when it becomes clear from a review of the case that the prosecution has
convicted an innocent person. See Green, ProsecutorialEthics in Retrospect, supra note 1,
at 472-73.
59. David G. Trager, Do Bar Associations Ethics Committees Serve the Public or the
Profession?:An Argument for Process Change, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1129 (2006).
60. DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-104(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
61. Trager, supra note 59, at 1160 (2006); see also Flowers, supra note 39, at 939 ("The
adversarial process is as much a part of the American heritage as capitalism or sporting
competitions.").
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appropriate. Only when those rules came back to bite the party who
advocated them would the rules be reassessed.62
Thus, the adversarial system characterizing prosecutors and defense
lawyers' interactions in court is also present in the process by which
"ethical rules are made and, especially, interpreted." 63 While certainly
controversial, defense lawyers who do not realize this political reality will
find themselves at a disadvantage if they do not take seriously their
responsibility and opportunity to have a voice in the process by which
professional standards are set for prosecutors.
Professor Fred Zacharias made similar observations regarding the
adoption of ABA Model Rule 3.8(f)64 in his case study.65 The rule governs
whether and when prosecutors may subpoena defense attorneys to testify
about client affairs.66 The proponents of subpoena reform came, for the
most part, from the defense bar.67 Prosecutors instinctively opposed the
changes, viewing them as "the defense bar's attempt to control
prosecutors for their own gain."68 As is not unusual in state bar politics,
ethics rule-making becomes a zero-sum game in which prosecutors think
they must be losing an advantage if an additional duty or restriction is
placed on them that does not have a comparable effect on the defense.
The problem is particularly acute when prosecutors face piecemeal
changes in ethical rules. "Recent history shows that piecemeal limits on
prosecutorial discretion, particularly where some prosecutors have
limited the exercise of discretion on their own, make all prosecutors more
likely to resist the regulation on political grounds."69
Recognizing that prosecutors will be suspicious of proposed changes in
their ethical obligations, defense lawyers must carefully weigh what they
are trying to accomplish by the proposed rule. The process by which
ethical rules are studied is likely to reveal to the defense both
62. Trager, supra note 59, at 1160. In that situation, it was the defense lawyers who
had flexed their muscle in the ethics committee in support of a rule that prohibited the
secret taping.of witnesses. This ultimately became a problem for defense lawyers who
realized that they, too, had an interest in recording witnesses who might change their
stories. Id.
63. Id. at 1162.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(f (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).

65. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993).
66.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e) (AM. BAR ASs'N 1983).

67. Zacharias, supra note 65, at 293.
68. Id. at 294; see also Green, ProsecutorialEthics in Retrospect, supra note 1, at 482
("The problem is that prosecutors will not necessarily distinguish good ethics regulation
from bad but will reflexively oppose any proposed new rules governing prosecutors'
conduct.").
69. Zacharias, supra note 65, at 308 n.276.
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regarding
positions
and philosophical
practices
prosecutorial
information
be
valuable
prosecutors' proposed duties. In itself, that may
to the defense bar and an opportunity to reveal to the greater legal
community how prosecutors would like to exercise their discretion.
Meaningful reform only comes with trust, so defense lawyers must be
cautious in using the ethical rules reform process to affect prosecutorial
practices. 70
III. RAMPING UP DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRAFTING
AND ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICAL RULES

At its heart, combatting prosecutorial misconduct is a political
problem that requires skilled engagement in the political process,
especially in the drafting, reviewing, and enforcement of ethical rules.
While judges could rein in errant prosecutors, countervailing political
pressures often prevent them from doing So. 71 The issue, then, is whether
defense lawyers can and should rely more heavily upon bar disciplinary
rules and enforcement proceedings to influence prosecutors.
Beware. While defense lawyers may want to use these tools to bring
constructive change, defense lawyers cannot consider the adoption or
enforcement of ethical rules as just another means to resist or attack
prosecutors. Prosecutors have warned against this happening, and they
are likely to have sympathizers within the decision-making bodies. To
truly influence whether prosecutors will be held responsible for
disciplinary violations, defense lawyers must engage openly and candidly
in the political process leading to the adoption and enforcement of ethical
rules. This means increased involvement by the defense bar in
organizations and commissions traditionally dominated by prosecutors,
at least in some jurisdictions. Defense lawyers must also become active
in those bodies actually having a role in enforcing disciplinary rules.
Although defense lawyers have for years taken a role in ABA reform
committees, this involvement is not the same as sitting on state
disciplinary courts or reform commissions. Using the ethical rules as an
innovation requires that defense lawyers be represented among the
prosecutors and judges of the state bars.

70.

For an invaluable history of the adoption and implementation of ABA Rule 3.8, see

Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: ProsecutorialEthics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2009).
71. Some of these pressures include the fact that in many states, judges are elected to
the bench. The support or lack of support by local prosecutors can have a profound impact
on the judge's own election. Thus, it is no surprise that judges are often very deferential to

prosecutors. See Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for the
Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787 (2001).
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Of course, there are many challenges to using this innovation. First,
defense lawyers must join the "establishment" rather than posture
themselves as underdogs in the criminal justice system. This may require
more of a mindset change than one might expect. It also requires
engagement with political officials who have influence in the
appointment of positions in state bar disciplinary systems. California is
not the only jurisdiction where prosecutors dominate committees on
attorney professionalism or where the presence of public defenders is
rare. For example, New York's committee does not have one public
defender on its roster. 72
Second, defense lawyers must organize themselves. 73 Often times,
competing defense groups are represented when there is a call for public
comment on ethical rules governing prosecutors and defense lawyers.
One of the challenges in the passage of California's version of Rule 3.8
was that the state defense lawyers had multiple representatives who
could not agree on what language should be included in the rule. 74
75
Prosecutors have long found the benefit of providing a united front.
Although there may be internal disagreements, when it comes to drafting
new codes of procedure or ethics, prosecutors have been willing to
76
mobilize in unified support of their position.

72. Committee on Attorney ProfessionalismRoster, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, https://nys
ba.org/wcm/committeeroster?commId=A16100 (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). However, the
State Bar Committee does boast Norman Effman, a Wyoming County Public Defender. See
Executive Committee Roster, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, https://nysba.org/wcm/committee
roster?commId=A1000 (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
73. On the national level, both prosecutors and defense lawyers have well-established
groups to represent their constituents in rule-making activities. For example, the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards Committee received input from non-voting liaisons, including
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the National Association of Attorneys
General, the National District Attorneys Association, the U.S. Department of Justice, and
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). However, on the state and local

levels, defense lawyers may be less organized and cohesive in their responses. This proved
true in the California experience.
74. Letter from California's Public Defender's Association and California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice to the State Bar of California (Oct. 8, 2015) (on file with State Bar of
California).
75. For more than fifty years, prosecutors have appreciated the power of speaking with
a united front. See, e.g., Letter from California District Attorneys Association to
Commission on the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Oct. 1, 2015) (on file with
State Bar of California); Fred Erisman, United Front-BarCommittee, Judges, Prosecutors
Unite for New Code of Criminal Procedure, 25 TEX. B.J. 1017 (1962).
76. Indeed, as others have chronicled, prosecutors do not have a single attitude toward
professional regulation and regulators. See Green, Prosecutors, supra note 11, at 897. Yet,
anti-regulatory rhetoric can dominate the process. Id. at 898.

768

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Third, defense lawyers must be prepared to discipline their own.
Ethical rules will lose their validity if they are enforced only against
prosecutors. With the rampant problem of ineffective assistance of
counsel, forcing prosecutors to follow the rules will be viewed as
hypocritical if there is not the same emphasis on requiring defense
lawyers to perform professionally. 77 Moreover, defense lawyers must
consider carefully whether their resistance to new ethical rules, such as
the duty to report new information that demonstrates that a defendant
was wrongfully convicted, undermines their efforts to impose new ethical
duties on prosecutors.78 Defense lawyers need not abandon their
principled responsibilities to their clients, but the more they can do to
show their commitment to the ethical rules, the more leverage they will
have in arguing that prosecutors should do the same.
Fourth, defense lawyers must determine whether there are better
ways to encourage better ethical compliance by prosecutors, especially
with regard to discovery obligations. With the advent of Conviction
Integrity Units, cooperative efforts between prosecutors and defense
lawyers might lead to more beneficial results than increasing the threat
of disciplinary actions against prosecutors.79 The push for more
Conviction Integrity Units continues, including by federal judges.80
Installing in prosecution offices a unit dedicated toward ensuring
fairness to defendants who claim to have been wrongfully convicted will
help when there are efforts to establish ethical rules to combat the
underlying problems that led to those wrongful convictions.
Finally, defense lawyers must resist the temptation to turn every
prosecutorial mistake into an ethical violation. While defense lawyers
have a duty to act zealously on behalf of their clients, prosecutors who
feel attacked are less likely to act in a collaborative manner, especially
when such collaboration might benefit a defendant. Thus, defense
lawyers must think strategically about when a disciplinary action will
help both their client and subsequent defendants. To the extent that
prosecutors are prepared to remedy their mistakes without disciplinary

77. See Barbara R. Levine, Preventing Defense Counsel Error-An Analysis of Some
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims and their Implicationsfor ProfessionalRegulation,
15 U. TOL. L. REV. 1275 (1984).
78. See David L. Hudson Jr., Innocence Awareness: Some States Now Require All
Attorneys to Report Wrongful Convictions, 103 A.B.A. J., Sept. 2017, at 24.
79. See Daniel Kroepsch, Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees and Conviction
Integrity Units: How InternalProgramsAre Fulfillingthe Prosecutor'sDuty to Serve Justice,
29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095 (2016) (reviewing the impact of conviction integrity units
and best practices units on improving prosecutorial compliance with rules).
80. See Alex Kozinski, CriminalLaw 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxxi
(2015).
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action, this approach might provide more opportunities for defense
counsel than sanctions against an individual prosecutor. 81
CONCLUSION
Using ethical discipline to motivate prosecutors can be a disruptive,
but positive, innovation if it is approached thoughtfully. If the courts will
not hold prosecutors in check, perhaps professional bodies can. However,
accomplishing this goal will take savvy, political will, and engagement
by defense lawyers. It will also take a willingness to "put aside the hostile
rhetoric, recognize legitimate interests on both sides, and search for
82
meaningful solutions to increasingly complex problems."

Before closing, it seems important to ask whether there is something
basically underhanded in prosecutors and defense lawyers even seeking
83
an advantage in the drafting and enforcement of ethical rules. After all,
shouldn't both sides simply want ethical standards that lead to the
fairest and most accurate outcomes of a case? Indeed, that is an
aspirational goal, but not, if experience proves true, a realistic one. Even
when prosecutors and defense lawyers leave the courtroom, they angle
for strategic advantage. As was once said, "[T]he difference between
ethics and politics seems to [be] artificial, if there is a significant
difference at all."84 Defense lawyers are well within their ethical
boundaries in speaking out in the rule-making process and advocating
for rules they believe will help their clients. That is a different tactic than
using ethical rules to threaten prosecutors during their cases so as to

81. Criminal practice need not be a game of "gotcha" by either side. As with other
issues, the nature of the prosecutor's mistake, willingness to admit it, complexity of the
issue, and prior violations are all factors to be assessed in determining the proper response
by defense counsel and the court. Certainly, defense lawyers should not abandon the
interests of their clients. However, if a mistake can be remedied, it is sometimes in the
defense lawyer's interest to propose remedies other than sanctioning the prosecutor. For
example, if a prosecutor has not provided discovery, seeking a commitment to open file
discovery by that prosecutor in the future may lead to better results for defendants than a
mere reprimand of the offending prosecutor.
82. Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare between Prosecutors and Defense
Lawyers: A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 515, 541 (1992).
83. Am. BAR Ass'N, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT SCOPE ¶ 20 (2009) advocates
against the use of ethical rules as tactical weapons in litigation. In a lengthy article, Frank
0: Bowman III attacked the misuse of ethical rules against prosecutors, especially federal
prosecutors. See generally Frank 0. Bowman III, A Bludgeon By Any Other Name: The
Misuse of "EthicalRules" Against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 665 (1996).
84. Randy Cohen, The Politics of Ethics, THE NATION, Mar. 21, 2002, at 2.
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obtain better results, an action which raises serious concerns. 85 One can
support a clear role for defense counsel in the adoption of ethical rules
without advocating that prosecutors or others be banned or held hostage
by unsupported ethical rules.8 6
The rule-making process is just another venue in which defense
lawyers can air their grievances with the operation of the criminal justice
system. By zealously advocating for a new rule, or the enforcement of one
already adopted by the jurisdiction, defense lawyers can bring to the
attention of bar leaders and, in many cases, the supreme court justices of
their state who must adopt the rules, ongoing problems with
prosecutorial practices. There is a reason defense lawyers want strong
rules, and there is nothing improper in using professional bodies to air
such concerns. So long as defense lawyers are honest in their
representations, any disruptions in current practices have the potential
of improving the criminal justice system-not just for the defense lawyer,
but also for prosecutors who should want better methods to protect
against wrongful convictions.

85. See Kirsten M. Schimpff, Rule 3.8, the Jencks Act, and How the ABA Created a
Conflict between Ethics and the Law on ProsecutorialDisclosure, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1729,
1772 (2012) (discussing criminal defense attorney Irwin Schwartz's controversial "article
urging defense lawyers to use Rule 3.8(d) as a 'tool' to 'secure discovery of exculpatory and
mitigating information').
86. Thus, this Article does not advocate that bar authorities adopt a "We don't care
what you think. We've got the votes. Do it our way or get disbarred" approach to the
adoption of ethical rules. See Bowman, supra note 83, at 770. Rather, defense lawyers must
be given a respectful and receptive venue in which to advocate in favor of reforms in the
ethical rules.

